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ABSTRACT 
This Note examines the codification of affirmative consent statutes in New York and 
California as well as the language of Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972, 
with the ultimate goal of demonstrating that the two statutory constructions cannot 
co-exist without jeopardizing accused students’ due process rights. During the course 
of a college or university disciplinary proceeding in an affirmative consent 
jurisdiction, the potential exists for a burden shift onto the accused student to 
affirmatively prove consent was obtained. Such a shift directly conflicts with Title 
IX mandates for prompt and equitable treatment. This Note proposes that in order to 
mitigate any confusion created by the aforementioned conflict between affirmative 
consent statutes and Title IX, a policy shift in college and university disciplinary 
proceedings is necessary. Rather than require an accused student to face a panel of 
peers and administrators in a hearing forum designed to decide the student’s 
responsibility, this Note proposes an investigatory model as a more appropriate 
format for adjudicating sexual assault cases on college campuses. The investigatory 
model allows colleges and universities to conduct comprehensive interviews and 
investigations in a less contentious, less formal setting, allowing schools to gather 
and contest necessary facts to make an informed decision on responsibility and 
sanctions, while more effectively honoring accused students’ due process rights. 
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PREFACE 
The purpose of this Note is to meaningfully discuss the conflict 
between affirmative consent statutes and the requirements mandated 
by Title IX for institutions of higher education adjudicating sexual 
assault cases between students, while focusing on the threats to 
accused students’ due process rights this conflict creates. The author 
wishes to preface this Note with the assertion that this Note, while 
focusing predominantly on the effect affirmative consent has on the 
rights of the accused student, in no way invalidates the serious 
problem of sexual assault on college campuses. Sexual assault remains 
a complex and sensitive issue and the author does not aim to minimize 
the suffering of those students who have been victimized, nor does the 
author suggest that victims’ rights are any less important than those of 
accused students. The author asks, however, that the reader understand 
that the scope of this Note is focused on the rights of accused students 
and that the reader keep an open mind when considering the argument 
that accused students’ rights are an essential part of the equation when 
dealing with sexual assault on college campuses. 
INTRODUCTION 
he year is 2014. President Obama stands in the East Room of the 
White House and announces the “It’s On Us” campaign, a 
nationwide initiative to raise awareness and encourage young people 
to become more involved in preventing sexual assault on college 
campuses.1 Ten days later, California becomes the first state in the 
nation to sign into law a bill colloquially titled “Yes Means Yes,” 
requiring public colleges and universities to implement a sexual 
assault policy where affirmative consent must be obtained throughout 
an entire sexual encounter.2 President Obama’s initiative and 
California’s new law come at a time when the national spotlight shines 
																																																								
1 Michael D. Shear and Elena Schneider, Obama Unveils Push for Young People 
to Do More Against Campus Assaults, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014, 6:34 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/us/politics/obama-campaign-college-
sexual-assaults.html [https://perma.cc/SNT6-EEBY]. 
2 Bill Chappell, California Enacts ‘Yes Means Yes’ Law, Defining Sexual 
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hot and bright on college campuses in the wake of several highly 
publicized sexual assault cases.3 In the summer of 2015, New York 
followed California’s lead by passing its own affirmative consent 
statute, which extends not only to public colleges and universities, but 
to private institutions as well.4 At the time of this writing, there are 
fourteen states with proposed affirmative consent statutes moving 
through their legislatures.5 Victims’ rights advocates champion these 
new pieces of legislation.6 Meanwhile, lost in the shuffle of national 
publicity and groundbreaking legislation is the accused student. 
As affirmative consent statutes gain prevalence in college sexual 
assault policies, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title 
IX) has been increasingly invoked in holding college and university 
administrations accountable with regard to sexual assault.7 Generally, 
Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education 
programs or activities operated by recipients of federal financial 
assistance.8 In 2011, the United States Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued a “Dear Colleague Letter” (the 
Letter) to address issues of sexual assault on college campuses.9 The 
Letter established that sexual violence such as rape falls under the 
Title IX definition of sexual harassment, which schools are required to 
address.10 The OCR also outlined a series of steps in the Letter that 
schools must take in order to fairly and equitably investigate and 
adjudicate allegations of sexual assault on their campuses.11 
																																																								
3 Shear & Schneider, supra note 1. 
4 Susanne Craig and Jesse McKinley, New York’s Lawmakers Agree on Campus 
Sexual Assault Laws, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/06/17/nyregion/new-yorks-lawmakers-agree-on-campus-
sexual-assault-laws.html [https://perma.cc/S764-6XUQ]. 
5 See generally Affirmative Consent Laws (Yes Means Yes) State By State, 
AFFIRMATIVECONSENT.COM (Nov. 15, 2015, 10:05 AM), http://affirmative 
consent.com/affirmative-consent-laws-state-by-state/?hvid=3aRofN [https:// 
perma.cc/92WV-3SD3]. 
6 See Chappell, supra note 2. 
7 Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
to Colleagues (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LYN-HLAH]. 
8 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
9 Ali, supra note 7. 
10 Id. at 1. 
11 Id. at 9. 
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While Title IX is intended to promote equity and fairness when 
addressing sexual assault allegations,12 the introduction of affirmative 
consent statutes creates confusion and conflict in the university 
disciplinary arena under these equitable standards. By requiring an 
accused student to prove affirmative consent was obtained in order to 
rebut a presumption that consent was not obtained, and thus a sexual 
assault occurred, accused students’ due process rights are endangered 
as schools attempt to comply simultaneously with both Title IX and 
their state’s affirmative consent statute. 
Tellingly, not even the representative who drafted California’s 
affirmative consent legislation can concretely articulate how such 
cases are to be adjudicated. When asked how an accused person is to 
prove he or she received consent, California Representative Bonnie 
Lowenthal, co-author of the state’s affirmative consent bill, responded 
“your guess is as good as mine. I think it’s a legal issue. Like any legal 
issue, that goes to the court.”13 
The purpose of this Note is to examine and critique California and 
New York’s affirmative consent statutes, as well as the language of 
Title IX, with the ultimate goal of demonstrating that the two statutory 
constructions cannot co-exist without seriously jeopardizing students’ 
due process rights. Part I of this Note will provide the necessary 
background on the development and implementation of the 
codification of affirmative consent into law, and review both the 
history of Title IX as a civil rights statute and its evolution as an 
instrument in responding to sexual assaults on college campuses. 
Part II of this Note will examine the shifting burden of proof onto 
the accused student to affirmatively prove that he or she obtained 
affirmative consent as the nexus at which these two laws conflict. 
While affirmative consent requires an accused student to make a 
showing of proof to rebut an accusation,14 Title IX requires “prompt 
and equitable” treatment of cases involving sexual assault.15 The 
codification of affirmative consent as a statute creates a conflict with 
																																																								
12 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2015). 
13 Josh Dulaney, Students Question ‘Affirmative Consent’ Bill Designed to Combat 




14 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (2014). 
15 Ali, supra note 7, at 8. 
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Title IX, thereby increasing the risk of violations to students’ due 
process rights. 
Part III offers a brief statistical overview of the prevalence of 
sexual assaults on college campuses in order to illustrate the nature of 
the problem that college and university administrators face when 
writing their student conduct policies. Part III will further serve to 
illustrate the procedural due process landscape of a college or 
university’s disciplinary proceeding, delineating how those due 
process rights typically manifest themselves in disciplinary settings. In 
these proceedings, the student typically faces a panel of peers and 
administrators who will make a ruling on the student’s conduct and 
sanction the student accordingly. 
Finally, Part IV of this Note will suggest the best method for 
mitigating the confusion created by the conflict between affirmative 
consent statutes and Title IX, thus protecting accused students’ due 
process rights. Part IV will argue for a policy shift from a hearing to an 
investigatory model, allowing colleges and universities to conduct 
disciplinary investigations and proceedings in a less contentious and 
formal setting while still honoring the due process rights granted to 
accused students. 
PART I: BACKGROUND 
A. Affirmative Consent 
In 2014, California became the first state in the nation to pass an 
affirmative consent statute into law, a bill now known as the “Yes 
Means Yes” statute. Upon its passage, lawmakers explained the intent 
of the bill was to create safer learning environments for students and 
set in place “universal” policies for adjudicating complaints of sexual 
assault to ensure consistency and fairness.16 The California bill 
requires all California state schools to adopt an affirmative consent 
standard with regard to sexual assault, domestic violence, dating 
violence and stalking in order to receive state funds for student 
financial assistance.17 That standard is described as “affirmative, 
																																																								
16 Christina Rudolph, California Senate Bill 967 Does Not Make Everyone a 
Rapist: Proposed Guidelines for Analyzing its Ambiguities, 36 U. LA VERNE L. 
REV. 299, 300 (2015). 
17 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (2014). 
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conscious, and voluntary agreement” to engage in sexual activity.18 “It 
is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to 
ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others 
engaged in sexual activity.”19 However, the statute also instructs it will 
not be considered a valid excuse that the accused student’s belief in 
affirmative consent arose from the intoxication of the accused.20 On 
the other hand, if the complainant is incapacitated due to the influence 
of drugs or alcohol, consent cannot be given.21 The statute goes on to 
state that “lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor 
does silence mean consent.”22 According to California’s statute, 
“affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout the sexual encounter 
and can be revoked at any time.”23 
New York’s statute outlines a similar standard, defining consent as 
a knowing, voluntary and mutual decision among all participants to 
engage in sexual activity.24 Consent can be given by words or actions, 
provided those words or actions create clear permission regarding the 
participants’ willingness to engage in the sexual activity.25 Silence or 
lack of resistance does not meet the standard for consent.26 Further, 
consent is required regardless of whether the initiating party is under 
the influence of drugs and/or alcohol.27 
One major difference between the New York and California laws 
is that New York’s law also extends to private institutions.28 Thus, 
both California and New York have enacted sweeping legislation 
requiring all state institutions of higher education (in New York, 
private institutions as well) to write affirmative consent into their 













29 Id.; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (2014). 
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One concrete illustration of an affirmative consent statute can be 
found in the State University of New York (SUNY) system, which has 
implemented drastic changes to their sexual assault policies to 
conform to the statutory mandates required by affirmative consent as 
well as create a uniform policy statewide.30 A Title IX administrator 
with heavy involvement in re-writing the sexual assault policies 
indicates that while the opportunity has not yet arisen to compare data 
from this year and the previous year,31 students have received 
extensive education on the changing policies and certain SUNY 
schools have seen an increase in sexual assault reports.32 This same 
Title IX administrator indicates that some schools struggle with the 
application of the ambiguous language of the statute when both parties 
are intoxicated, as the policy reads, “consent is required, regardless of 
whether the person initiating the act is under the influence of drugs 
and/or alcohol.”33 As universities such as the SUNY system continue 
to grapple with the integration of the affirmative consent statutory 
mandate into their student conduct policies, Title IX remains a fixture 
in the adjudication of campus sexual assault disputes. 
B. Title IX 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) far 
precedes the enactment of affirmative consent statutes. Title IX 
mandates “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”34 The United States 
Department for Education (the Department) has issued a number of 
documents providing guidance for institutions of higher learning to 
																																																								
30 Interview with Jane Doe, a Title IX Administrator, SUNY (Nov. 2, 2015) 
(redacted transcript in the author’s possession available upon request) (All 
school administrators have asked to remain anonymous; therefore, no 
identifying information will be further provided in this article beyond what the 
administrator has permitted). 
31 Id. Data from these two years cannot be compared due to the novelty of the 
statute and the resulting unavailability of data. 
32 Id. The interviewee views this increased reporting as a positive change, as 
students appear to be showing confidence in the new policy. 
33 Id. 
34 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
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ensure compliance with Title IX.35 In 2001, the Department issued a 
guidance document reiterating the legal principal that sexual 
harassment is a form of sexual discrimination prohibited by Title IX.36 
Two landmark Supreme Court cases have further defined the Title IX 
standard. The first, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 
held that “a school may be liable for monetary damages if a teacher 
sexually harasses a student, the institution has actual knowledge of the 
harassment, and is deliberately indifferent in responding to the 
harassment.”37 The second, Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education, held that “a school may also be liable for monetary 
damages if one student sexually harasses another student in the 
school’s program and the conditions of Gebser are met.”38 However, 
in its 2001 guidance document, the Department explicitly 
distinguished between a school’s liability standards established by 
those cases39 and the power of federal agencies to enforce 
requirements that “effectuate Title IX’s nondiscrimination mandate.”40 
In 2011, the Department followed its 2001 guidance document 
with a “Dear Colleague Letter” intended to provide further guidance to 
institutions of higher learning with Title IX compliance.41 The Letter 
reiterated that sexual violence is a form of sexual harassment covered 
under Title IX.42 Such forms of sexual violence include rape, sexual 
assault, sexual battery, and sexual coercion.43 The Letter also indicated 
that its purpose was to provide policy guidance to colleges and 
universities so that these institutions will remain in compliance with 
																																																								
35 U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., Sex Discrimination: Policy Guidance, http://www2. 
ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/faq/rr/policyguidance/sex.html [https:// 
perma.cc/A457-LL3A] (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).  
36 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Revised Sexual Harassment 
Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or 
Third Parties, TIT. IX (Jan. 2001), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR2V-8JQW]. 
37 Id. at i-ii. 
38 Id. at ii. 
39 Id. at iii. Liability is limited to private actions for monetary damages. 
40 Id. at ii (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 
292 (1998)). 
41 See Dear Colleague, supra note 8. 
42 Id. at 1-2. 
43 Id. 
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Title IX.44 The guidelines established by the Letter include the 
assertion that Title IX investigations of sexual assault allegations must 
be prompt, thorough and impartial.45 A school is also required to adopt 
and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable 
resolution of student and employee sex discrimination.46 The Letter 
explains that an investigating body, when determining whether a 
grievance procedure is prompt and equitable, will examine several 
elements.47 These include: notice to students of the grievance 
procedures, including where complaints may be filed; adequate, 
reliable, and impartial investigation of complaints, including the 
opportunity for both parties to present witnesses and other evidence; 
and notice to parties of the outcome of the complaint.48 While this list 
is instructive, the Letter asserts that it is not exhaustive, as grievance 
procedures will vary in detail, specificity and components.49 
Ultimately, the Letter seeks to impress upon schools that failure to 
voluntarily comply with the guidelines set forth in the Letter may 
result in the OCR50 initiating proceedings to withdraw federal funding 
or referring the case to the U.S. Department of Justice for litigation.51 
To offer additional guidance to schools on compliance procedures 
with Title IX, the Department of Education issued a further guiding 
document entitled Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual 
Violence in 2014.52 While a disciplinary hearing is not required, the 
designated Title IX coordinator remains responsible for examining the 
disciplinary process in order to ensure compliance with Title IX’s 
prompt and equitable requirements.53 Further, a school is required to 
																																																								
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 5. 
46 Id. at 6 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b)). 
47 Id. at 9. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 OCR is the enforcing agency of the Department of Education. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, About OCR, (Jan. 27, 2015) http:// 
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/aboutocr.html [https://perma.cc/CBX4-
7P2Z]. 
51 Ali, supra note 7, at 16. 
52 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Questions and Answers on Title 
IX and Sexual Violence (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/85WE-XKP9]. 
53 Id. at 25. 
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give the complainant any rights that it gives the accused student during 
the investigation and during any subsequent disciplinary proceeding.54 
PART II:  THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT    
STATUTES AND TITLE IX CREATES A THREAT TO DUE 
PROCESS 
A.  Affirmative Consent Imposes Inequitable Presumptions 
and Standards 
The statutory language of affirmative consent indicates “it is the 
responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to ensure 
that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others to 
engage in the sexual activity.”55 However, conspicuously absent from 
the statute is clear instruction on how an accused student should 
proceed in proving that they in fact obtained affirmative consent.56 
Even more troubling is the requirement that the accused “take 
reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the 
time, to ascertain whether the complainant affirmatively consented.”57 
In light of this ambiguous language, where silence nor lack of protest 
or resistance does not mean consent,58 the burden arguably shifts to the 
accused student to prove that he or she obtained consent and took 
reasonable steps to obtain it throughout the sexual encounter. 
Supporters of affirmative consent statutes argue that the responsibility 
to ensure consent during sex is typical of behaviors exhibited during 
consensual sexual encounters.59 However, when the question of 
consent moves out of the bedroom and into a university disciplinary 
proceeding, an accused student is arguably placed in a position to 
prove that consent was obtained to rebut the presumption that consent 
was not obtained. 
In August of 2015, a trial court in Tennessee issued a ruling that 
supports the argument that accused students are placed in an unfair 
position during university disciplinary proceedings where affirmative 
consent is the policy standard. In Mock v. University of Tennessee at 
																																																								
54 Id. at 26. 
55 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (a)(1) (2014). 
56 See id. 
57 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (a)(2)(B) (2014). 
58 Id. 
59 See Rudolph, supra note 16, at 301. 
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Chattanooga, the court held that the burden of proof was improperly 
shifted and imposed an untenable standard upon the accused student to 
disprove the accusation that he forcibly assaulted the complainant.60 In 
Mock, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the accused student 
(Mock) responsible for violating University Code of Conduct, Section 
7 and ordered his dismissal from the University.61 Mock appealed the 
decision to the University Chancellor, and a hearing was conducted in 
which both sides, including the complainant, argued their respective 
positions.62 The Chancellor upheld the ruling and ordered Mock’s 
expulsion.63 Mock argued on appeal that the University Chancellor 
shifted the burden of proof from the University and placed it upon 
Mock, removing the requirement that the University prove a lack of 
consent or inability to consent.64 Mock further argued that, as a 
consequence of this burden shift, the University Chancellor found 
Mock “violated the affirmative consent standard, essentially 
formalizing a presumption of guilt and requiring Mr. Mock to prove 
his innocence as an affirmative defense.”65 
																																																								
60 Mock v. Univ. of Tenn., No. 14-1687-II (Ch. Ct. of Davidson Cnty. Tenn., Aug. 
4, 2015). 
61 Id. at 2 (The administrative judge made the following findings of fact: Mock and 
the complainant were known to each other before the alleged sexual assault, 
which took place at a party. Both Mock and the complainant had been drinking. 
The complainant alleges that at some point during the evening, she consumed 
something that affected her memory, making her feel as if she were in “a fog.” 
The complainant became sick from the alcohol and sometime later Mock 
discovered her on the bathroom floor. They moved into an adjacent bedroom, 
where they engaged in sexual intercourse. The ALJ made a preliminary 
credibility determination of the complainant, whereby the complainant’s “own 
testimony did not convince the hearing officer that she was intoxicated in order 
to prove that Mock knew or should have known that her ability to consent was 
seriously compromised.” However, following the university’s petition for 
reconsideration, the ALJ made no changes to her findings of fact but reversed 
her Initial Order by changing her conclusions and held that the university proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the complainant never consented to 
sexual activity). Author’s note: We can infer, based on the ALJ’s determinations 
of the complainant’s testimony that the complainant testified at the initial 
hearing. 
62 Id. at 3. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 6. 
65 Id. 
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The Chancery Court in the Mock case ultimately held that Mock’s 
expulsion was “arbitrary and capricious” and a violation of Mock’s 
due process rights when the University improperly interpreted the 
Student Conduct Code and unfairly shifted the burden from the 
charging party (the University), to the charged student (Mock).66 The 
University took the position that it satisfied its burden of proof to show 
that no affirmative consent was obtained by requiring the charged 
student to affirmatively prove consent67 and the Chancery Court found 
this shift to be “flawed and untenable if due process is to be afforded 
the accused.”68 The Court further opined that, under the University’s 
flawed standard, the accused student 
Must come forward with proof of an affirmative verbal response 
that is credibly in an environment in which there are seldom, if any, 
witnesses to an activity which requires exposing each party’s most 
private body parts. Absent the tape recording of a verbal consent or 
other independent means to demonstrate that consent was given, the 
ability of an accused to prove the complaining party’s consent strains 
credulity and is illusory.69 
The Mock case does not hold legal precedent in other states, nor 
does Tennessee have an affirmative consent statute requiring all public 
colleges and universities to develop an affirmative consent standard 
for their sexual assault policies. The case is based on a unique set of 
facts and law requiring a university in Tennessee to produce evidence 
proving that a student violated the student code of conduct. One 
commentator observes that such legalisms as “burden of proof” have 
no place in campus disciplinary proceedings,70 and there is a concerted 
danger in applying such terms to disciplinary hearings that closely 
resemble legal proceedings, but are in fact civil proceedings with 
much lower standards of evidence and proof than criminal legal 
proceedings.71 
																																																								
66 Id. at 23. 
67 Id. at 11. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 12. 
70 Brett A. Sokolow & Daniel C. Swinton, Corey Mock v. The University of 
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Nonetheless, the court’s reasoning on the issue of consent in the 
Mock case compellingly illustrates the difficulties colleges and 
universities may encounter when attempting to apply an affirmative 
consent standard in a hearing forum that is akin to a legal proceeding, 
but does not conform to the high burdens and strict rules of a 
courtroom. Further, the Mock ruling is illustrative of the inequitable 
environment that can exist when a school unfairly imposes a burden of 
production on a student to prove they obtained affirmative consent, 
lest the presumption that consent was not obtained stands and the 
student is found responsible for a violation of sexual assault policy.72 
																																																								
72 A further possible cause for confusion that may arise as a result of the standard 
created by the language of New York and California’s affirmative consent laws 
can be found in the statutory clauses attempting to define when consent may or 
may not be valid due to intoxication by either party. Both New York and 
California statutes contain clauses that mandate it will not be a valid excuse for 
an accused student to allege a lack of affirmative consent if the accused 
student’s belief in the affirmative consent arose from the intoxication of the 
accused. However, juxtaposed with this clause is a second clause that allows the 
opposite for the complainant. Both statutes require that a complainant cannot 
give consent if that person is incapacitated due to drugs or alcohol, and thus 
cannot knowingly give consent. However, the statute fails to provide a standard 
for which colleges and universities are to draw a line between intoxication and 
incapacitation to the point where the complainant can no longer consent. 
Therefore, while the accused student may not use his or her level of intoxication 
as a factor to aid a disciplinary adjudicator in determining whether affirmative 
consent was obtained or not, the complainant may use his or her level of 
intoxication to argue that they were impaired to a degree that invalidates any 
consent they may have given. Where the statute does not give guidance on the 
line between mere intoxication and impairment however, the statutory language 
arguably creates an inequitable standard for accused students, which would 
appear to be in conflict with the mandates of Title IX. Courts have generally 
held that voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense to general intent crimes. 
See Chad J. Layton, No More Excuses: Closing the Door on the Voluntary 
Intoxication Defense, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535 (1997). However, some 
jurisdictions allow a defendant to form a voluntary intoxication defense to 
specific intent crimes, which may include sexual crimes. See Carter v. State, 408 
N.E.2d 790 (1980) (holding that the charge of assault and battery with the intent 
to satisfy sexual desires was a specific intent crime and thus the defense of 
voluntary intoxication was available to the defendant); see also State v. Brown, 
244 P.3d 267 (2011) (holding that the charge of aggravated indecent liberties 
was a specific intent crime and thus the defense of voluntary intoxication was 
available to the defendant). Given that criminal jurisprudence is undecided on 
the use of intoxication as a defense, depending upon the jurisdiction, such 
language arguably has no place in a statute governing university disciplinary 
proceedings, where legal procedures hold no weight. Such language may only 
	
2016 Affirmative Confusion 427 
B. While Title IX requires equitable treatment 
Juxtaposed against the affirmative consent statutes requiring 
colleges and universities in New York and California to adopt 
affirmative consent into their sexual assault policies is the federal 
statutory mandate of Title IX, which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sex in education programs or activities operated by recipients 
of federal financial assistance.73 In order for a school to be compliant 
with Title IX, the school’s sex discrimination grievance procedures 
must be adequate, reliable, impartial and prompt.74 While an 
investigation may include a hearing to determine whether the conduct 
occurred, Title IX does not necessarily require a hearing.75 However, 
the Dear Colleague Letter acknowledges that schools will generally 
employ hearings in conjunction with their investigations to determine 
whether sexual harassment or violence occurred.76 The Letter further 
provides that in order to comport with equitable grievance procedure 
requirements so as not to violate Title IX, schools are required to use a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, and afford the parties equal 
opportunity to present relevant witnesses and other evidence.77 The 
Mock court’s decision arguably illustrates an inequity in the university 
disciplinary system that conflicts with the equitable and impartial 
requirements of Title IX.78 If an accused student is required to make a 
showing that affirmative consent was in fact obtained, the disciplinary 
process is no longer impartial and no longer equitable. As a result, 
students’ due process rights are threatened in an environment where 
colleges and universities are attempting to comply with both a 
statutory mandate for affirmative consent and the gender-balancing 
mandate of Title IX. 
																																																																																																																																			
increase confusion for schools attempting to enforce these policies and conform 
to an affirmative consent statute while at the same time attempting to afford both 
parties equal rights under Title IX mandates. 
73 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
74 Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra note 52, at 25. 
75 Id. 
76 Ali, supra note 7, at 10. 
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78 See Mock v. Univ. of Tenn., No. 14-1687-II 1, 20 (Ch. Ct. of Davidson Cnty. 
Tenn., Aug. 4, 2015). 
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C. The Threat to Due Process Created by This Conflict 
Due process has long been a highly contested issue on public 
college campuses. The Supreme Court has offered little guidance on 
the procedural and substantive due process rights afforded students at 
colleges and universities.79 Procedurally, the Supreme Court has held 
that, at a minimum, a student has the right to effective notice and an 
informal hearing permitting the student to give his version of events.80 
This aligns with the basic language of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which requires that “deprivation of life, liberty or property by 
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case.”81 The Supreme Court further 
acknowledges that longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder 
of a school term, or permanently, may require more formal 
procedures.82 However, the Court refrains from making a 
determination on a basic formula for a hearing that students may be 
entitled to under the due process clause.83 Beyond notice and the right 
to some type of hearing, the Supreme Court made no further ruling on 
any other rights to which a student may be entitled in a college 
disciplinary hearing.84 Substantively, a student is afforded a due 
process protection against arbitrary dismissals.85 Further, there must be 
some reasonable and constitutional ground for expulsion or the courts 
would have a duty to require reinstatement.86 
The conflicts created by inconsistencies between affirmative 
consent statutes and Title IX provisions create an environment where 
colleges and universities increasingly run the risk of violating accused 
students’ due process rights. The Mock court’s decision illustrates an 
application of the substantive due process violation that can occur 
when affirmative consent is utilized in a university disciplinary 
proceeding. The court held that the improper burden shift onto the 
																																																								
79 Lisa. L. Swem, Due Process Rights in Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J.C. & 
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80 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975). 
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82 Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. 
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accused student imposed “an untenable standard upon Mr. Mock to 
prove that he forcible [sic] assaulted [the complainant]” rendering his 
expulsion from the school arbitrary and capricious.87 In New York and 
California, the affirmative consent standard is statutorily mandated and 
failure to comply may result in cuts to funding for schools.88 
Concurrently, Title IX requires an impartial and equitable 
investigation into sexual assault allegations, and a failure to comply 
with these standards will result in an investigation by the Office of 
Civil Rights and potential cuts to federal funding.89 As schools attempt 
to enforce affirmative consent standards to comply with the statutory 
mandate, the threat of unequal burden shifts, like the one in Mock, 
becomes increasingly plausible, and the disciplinary process becomes 
inequitable. Schools will thus be in violation of Title IX mandates, 
opening themselves up to scrutiny from the OCR and potential 
litigation from accused students over sanctions as a result of unfair 
processes. 
PART III:  TRENDS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 
AND DISCIPLINE 
A. A Statistical Illustration of the Problem   
Due to the novelty of affirmative consent statutes and the recent 
close scrutiny of university sexual assault policies, data is fairly 
limited on the statistical effect of affirmative consent statutes in New 
York and California and whether they are impacting sexual assault 
rates. Research consistently shows that one in five women report being 
sexually assaulted on college campuses, with experts believing these 
numbers to be an underestimation because sexual assault is vastly 
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430 UMass Law Review v. 11 | 412 
underreported.90 Research also shows that at least 50 percent of 
campus sexual assaults are associated with alcohol use.91 Of sexual 
assaults involving alcohol use, between 81 percent and 97 percent 
involved both parties consuming alcohol.92 Furthermore, less than one-
third of students found responsible for sexual assault are expelled from 
their colleges, while roughly 47 percent are suspended upon being 
found responsible.93 
A 2015 survey conducted by the risk-management group, United 
Educators (UE), provides compelling analysis of trends regarding 
perpetrators in sexual assault cases.94 The UE report indicates that 
when sexual assaults are adjudicated, institutions impose their severest 
sanctions.95 The study found that 43 percent of perpetrators deemed 
responsible were expelled.96 Alternatively, 12 percent were suspended 
for more than a year and 25 percent of those perpetrators found 
responsible were suspended for less than a year.97 
The numbers currently available regarding sexual assaults on 
college campuses and the statistics referring to accused student 
punishments are useful in order to understand the problem of sexual 
assault on college campuses generally, but are not illustrative of trends 
on college campuses now that affirmative consent has been codified 
and applied as a statutory mandate. Both states with affirmative 
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consent currently codified (New York and California) only 
implemented their legislation in 2015, and thus substantive data is not 
readily available on the mandates’ impact on college campuses. 
However, the threats to accused students’ due process rights as a result 
of the conflict between affirmative consent statutes and Title IX 
remain a compelling issue as schools continue to address the pervasive 
issue of sexual assault on their campuses. 
PART IV:  MOVING FROM HEARINGS TO INVESTIGATIONS TO 
MITIGATE POTENTIAL CONFLICT AND PROTECT DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS 
A. The Investigatory Model Formula 
One way that schools may seek to protect their students’ due 
process rights is by shifting their disciplinary setting from a hearing to 
an investigatory model. While current data is scarce on the number of 
schools that utilize a disciplinary hearing within their adjudication 
process, the Supreme Court has indicated in Goss v. Lopez that serious 
cases may require a more formal hearing.98 A procedurally sound 
disciplinary hearing gives a student the opportunity to be heard by a 
disciplinary committee, and even a full-panel hearing in more serious 
cases.99 The panel is screened to ensure impartiality and the student 
has the opportunity to present witnesses and question them.100 Upon 
the conclusion of a hearing, the panel will make a finding of 
responsibility and recommend a sanction.101 The student then has the 
opportunity to appeal the panel’s decision to a review board.102 While 
the hearing model is popular among colleges and universities, it is 
arguably inadequate for accused students to present their case in an 
affirmative consent jurisdiction while preserving their due process 
rights. The Supreme Court has firmly established that the only 
procedural rights a student is entitled in the university disciplinary 
proceeding are the right to notice of the charges against him or her and 
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the opportunity to be heard in some kind of hearing.103 With no further 
procedural guarantees, the student faces the panel alone, in a highly 
charged environment where he or she has been accused of sexual 
assault, without the ability to directly question his or her accuser due 
to Title IX mandates.104 In an affirmative consent jurisdiction, there is 
an increased risk of unfair bias or burden shifting as schools attempt to 
comply with the statutory mandate affirmative consent requires while 
also comporting with the requirements of Title IX. 
A more viable solution for protecting students’ due process rights 
in an affirmative consent jurisdiction is to move towards an 
investigatory model, which eliminates the hearing component of the 
disciplinary process. Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts 
has employed this policy for the past two years.105 In this model, once 
a complaint has been filed, the University assigns “the matter to an 
Administrative Investigator.”106 The Administrative Investigator 
provides notification and a copy of the complaint to the accused 
student.107 The accused student then has the opportunity to “submit a 
written response” to the complaint.108 “If the respondent does not 
respond, or otherwise fails to participate in the investigation, the 
Administrative Investigator will complete the investigation on the 
basis of [any] other information obtained.”109 The investigation must 
include: 
An analysis of the allegations and defenses presented using the 
preponderance of the evidence standard; consideration of all relevant 
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documents, including written statements and other materials presented 
by the parties; interviews of the parties and other individuals and/or 
witnesses; and/or reviewing certain documents or materials in the 
possession of either party that the Administrative Investigator has 
deemed relevant.110 
The Administrative Investigator may also consider police reports 
generated by campus police or local law enforcement during the 
investigation.111 “At the conclusion of the investigation, the 
Administrative Investigator shall prepare an Investigation Report for 
administrative review.”112 The Investigation Report provides a 
comprehensive outline of the steps taken during the investigation, 
including findings of fact.113 The Report also “states whether a policy 
violation has occurred based on the preponderance of the evidence, 
explains the rationale for the violation determination, and, if 
applicable, recommends a sanction(s).”114 
Following submission of the Investigative Report, a reviewing 
body then conducts an administrative review.115 The purpose of the 
administrative review is to determine whether the investigation was 
sufficient, defined as “prompt, fair, impartial and thorough.”116 If the 
reviewing body finds that the investigation does not meet these 
requirements, the Administrative Investigator will gather additional 
information.117 If the reviewing body determines that the investigation 
was sufficient, the reviewing body then considers whether the 
recommended sanction is appropriate.118 Once the administrative 
review is complete, the accused student receives notification of the 
reviewing body’s findings, including any sanctions imposed, and “a 
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B.  Good Policy: How the Investigatory Model Preserves Due 
Process Rights  
The investigatory model, as outlined in Bridgewater State 
University’s Student Code of Conduct is arguably a much sounder 
method of dealing with sexual assault allegations on college campuses 
than the disciplinary model. This is especially true in affirmative 
consent jurisdictions where the potential inequity created between 
affirmative consent and Title IX fosters an increased risk in due 
process violations for accused students. One student conduct 
administrator from a Massachusetts university recently proposed a 
total revision of the school’s disciplinary proceedings, shifting from a 
conduct hearing process to an investigatory process.120 The proposal 
outlines several compelling reasons why the investigatory model is 
superior to the conduct hearing model. Notably, the introductory 
overview states, “[n]ew information is coming to us on a daily basis 
from various governmental agencies and it is confusing and difficult to 
incorporate sometimes contradictory principles and expectations into 
our student conduct processes.”121 Further, the proposal emphasizes 
the desire to move away from legalistic and adversarial processes (i.e. 
a hearing), with the hopes of creating a process that focuses more on 
restorative justice.122 
The proposal goes on to illustrate positive policy and rationale 
reasons for making the change to an investigatory model. These 
include: limiting trauma for the victim by requiring him or her to tell 
their story ONCE to a qualified investigator who is trained to ask 
questions and make assessments based on a preponderance of the 
evidence standard; the complainant, accused student and witnesses are 
more likely to be open with an investigator in a one-on-one setting, 
making the interaction much less adversarial than a hearing; and 
questioning is likely to be more developmental with a trained 
investigator, rather than a panel of board members with little 
experience in dealing with sexual assault cases.123 
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Based on the policy reasons outlined in the proposal, the 
investigatory model offers a more relaxed setting that looks less like a 
formal legal proceeding. The complainant and the accused student are 
interviewed separately, eliminating contention that can undoubtedly 
materialize in a formal hearing. There will likely be less risk of 
imposing unfair presumptions or burdens of proof on the parties, as the 
investigator is free to gather facts and assess them independently of 
each other, culminating in a report that represents an objective 
rendering of the circumstances of the case. Therefore, eliminating 
hearings and instating an investigatory model may mitigate confusion 
for affirmative consent schools and allow them to facilitate compliance 
with Title IX requirements of impartial and equitable treatment of both 
parties. 
Colleges and universities may be reluctant to move away from the 
conduct hearing model. The SUNY system continues to use the 
conduct hearing model, even in the wake of the implementation of the 
affirmative consent statute.124 SUNY administrators considered 
moving from conduct hearings to an investigatory model, ultimately 
deciding to continue holding hearings in order to ensure due process 
for all involved students.125 However, it is important to emphasize that 
the law requires no particular form of hearing.126 Further, 
There is no general requirement that procedural due process in 
student disciplinary cases provide for legal representations, a public 
hearing, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, warnings 
about privileges, self-incrimination, application of principles of former 
or double jeopardy, compulsory production of witnesses, or any of the 
remaining features of federal criminal jurisprudence.127 
It is therefore important for colleges and universities to remember 
that simply providing some kind of notice and hearing does not violate 
a student’s due process rights.128 Proper notice and the opportunity to 
be heard in an informal setting, such as a meeting with an investigator 
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under the investigatory model is sufficient to meet due process 
standards, according to the Supreme Court.129 
CONCLUSION 
The pervasive problem of sexual assault on college campuses has 
resulted in nationwide media attention and a call to action from 
legislators, administrators and even the President of the United States. 
Affirmative consent statutes like those codified into law in New York 
and California are making their way through numerous state 
legislatures. However, affirmative consent statutes must co-exist with 
Title IX mandates seeking to eliminate discrimination on college 
campuses by promoting prompt, impartial and equitable response to 
sex discrimination, including sexual assault. Due to ambiguous 
affirmative consent statutes and the potential for misapplication of the 
standard in a formal hearing setting, affirmative consent risks creating 
an inequitable environment, which in turn creates a conflict with Title 
IX’s requirements of equitable treatment. As a result, accused students 
face potential violations to their due process rights in a formal conduct 
hearing setting. 
Schools can mitigate this risk by moving away from the conduct 
hearing model and implementing an investigatory model in order to 
clarify the application of affirmative consent while simultaneously 
complying with Title IX requirements of equitable treatment for both 
parties. The investigatory model maintains compliance with students’ 
due process rights and allows a trained investigator to make an 
objective determination of the facts in a less contentious setting for all 
parties involved. While the conduct hearing model has been the 
traditional formula for institutions of higher learning for many years, 
sexual assaults on college campuses and the legislature’s response in 
the form of affirmative consent statutes present new challenges for 
colleges and universities. By developing a more comprehensive 
system using the investigatory model, schools will be able to protect 
the rights of both the accused student and the complainant, ensuring 
safer campuses and a united front against the scourge of sexual assault 
in institutions of higher learning. 
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